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A Revolution in English Moral Theology
LINWOOD URBAN*
In his excellent study, The Spirit of Anglicanism in the lyth Cen
tury,1 H. R. McAdoo stresses the dependence of early Anglican Moral
Theology upon St. Thomas Aquinas. Bishop McAdoo makes so
impressive a case that it would now be irresponsible to deny that
Anglicans were more familiar with the Summa Theologica than had
been thought and that St. Thomas exerted an extensive influence
upon Anglican Theology with respect to organization and substance.
Although Bishop McAdoo notes that Anglican authors often treated
the material of the Summa Theologica with originality and were not
slavishly dependent upon it, nonetheless the unwary reader might
conclude that the essential positions of the Summa were represented
in English theological writings. It is this conclusion which this
paper will investigate with regard to a particularly important issue
in moral philosophy. That issue is the relationship between what
Kant called the Law of Nature and the Moral Law. To put the matter
simply: Is an action morally right because it conforms to the Law
of Nature, or, contrarily, is the Law of Nature to be followed because
it conforms to the Moral Law? In the first of these positions, the
specific requirements of the Moral Law are derived from the Law of
Nature. In the second, the Moral Law is autonomous. The Law of
Nature, also autonomous, is to be followed only when it conforms to
the Moral Law.
Anglican Moral Theology begins with St. Thomas and the first
view and then gradually moves to the second. While Richard Hooker
restates St. Thomas's position on the relationship between the Law
of Nature and the Moral Law, Joseph Butler reverses this relationship.
It is this radical shift in English moral thinking which this paper
seeks to demonstrate and explain. The crux of the change lies in
Hooker's modification of one of St. Thomas's critical theses; and,
once accepted, this modification made inevitable the reversal of the
relationship between the Moral Law and the Law of Nature. In order
to make clear the steps in this revolution, we shall first examine the
views of St. Thomas and Richard Hooker. We shall next briefly in
vestigate the views of the Cambridge Platonist, Henry More. Finally
ι Charles Scribner's Sons, 1965.
* Mr. Urban teaches Religion at Swarthmore College.
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we shall see the revolution completed in the writings of Joseph
Butler. Of course we will not attempt to document all aspects of this
radical change, nor will we claim that any of these men represented
what might be called the moral view of their time. Rather we are
maintaining that in the writings of these four influential thinkers
we find the steps of a logical progression from one type of ethical
theory to another. It is the steps of this logical progression which is
our concern and not other historical questions, which are interesting
and important in their own right.2
ST. THOMAS AND HOOKER ON THE MEANING OF "GOOD"
In his treatment on Law, St. Thomas makes the following points:3
1) "Every agent acts on account of an end, and 'to be an end'
carries the meaning of 'to be good/ "
2) "Consequently the first principle of the practical reason is
based on the meaning of 'good,' namely 'it is what all things seek
after.' "
3) "Since 'being goal' has the meaning of 'an end,' . . . it follows
that reason naturally apprehends as good objectives the things toward which man has a natural tendency."
It is important to note that St. Thomas has presented us with a
deduction. Since "good" means "end" or "that toward which something tends," and since all men naturally tend to do certain things,
human goods can be characterized as those ends toward which human
beings naturally tend. Hence men naturally take as good those objectives toward which they have a natural tendency. To this St.
Thomas adds that, because men have a natural tendency toward
self-preservation, "they naturally apprehend life as a good."4 Thus
the conclusion that the preservation of life is a good follows analytically from the definition of "good" as "end" when taken with the
premise that men have a natural instinct for self-preservation. Thus
one can evidently know that certain actions are good in virtue of
Right Reason, e.g., analytical reasoning.
It is also important to make clear the dependence of the Moral
Law upon the Law of Nature. "Good" is defined in terms of "end,"
that is, in terms of a natural property. In order to discover what is
2 Cf. H. R. McAdoo, The Structure of Caroline Moral Theology (Longmans, Green
& Co., 1949)/ for such a treatment.
3 Summa Theologica, I II 94 2 in corpore. I have used the Latin-English text
found in ST., Blackfriars, 1963, v. 28, p. 8of. In the main, I have followed the English translation given there.
4 Ibid., p. 82.
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good for a particular being, it is necessary to discover what its end is.
When we have discovered that toward which something always or
for the most part tends, we have discovered its good. Hence it is impossible to know what the good of some being is without knowing
the Natural Law which governs the activities of that being. Since
"the good ought always to be sought and done,"5 the primary rule of
the Moral Law can be stated as: Act in conformity with nature.
Having just given an account of the meaning of "good" in the
Summa, we are in a position to observe that in his Laws of Ecclesiastical
Polity Hooker follows St. Thomas very closely.
God alone excepted, who actually and everlastingly is whatsoever he may
be, and which cannot hereafter be that which now he is not; all other
things besides are somewhat in possibility, which as yet they are not in
act. And for this cause there is in all things an appetite or desire, whereby
they incline to something which they may be; and when they are it, they
shall be perfecter than now they are. All which perfections are contained
under the general name of Goodness.6
For Hooker like St. Thomas, "to be good" means "to have attained
one's completion or perfection." Thus the good of any being is that
toward which it tends or that for which it has a natural appetite. Like
St. Thomas, Hooker also draws the conclusion that self-preservation
is a good because all things naturally seek it.
The first degree of goodness is that general perfection which all things do
seek, in desiring the continuance of their being.7
So it is not surprising that Hooker should conclude that Human Nature, understood as the final cause or end toward which men naturally
tend, is the source of all our moral rules.
The knowledge of that which man is in reference unto himself, and other
things in relation unto man, I may justly term the Mother of all those
principles, which are as it were edicts, statutes, and decrees, in that Law of
Nature, whereby human actions are framed.8
To be sure, neither Hooker nor St. Thomas believes that we can discover all that we need to know about man's end by natural reason.
Nonetheless, the fact that we learn what man's last end is from
revelation does not negate the claim that "the human good" means
"man's end" or "human nature in its fulfillment."
5 Îbià., p. 80.
6 The Works of Mr. Richard Hooker (Oxford, 1874), Vol. I, "Laws etc.," Bk. I,
ch. 5, p. 215.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid., Bk. I, ch. 8, p. 230.
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Thus far we have noted that Richard Hooker agrees with St.
Thomas concerning the definition of "good." He also agrees that that
toward which a being has a natural appetite or tendency is its good.
Hence he agrees that the primary moral rule is: Act in conformity
with nature. We must now examine the important divergences between the position expressed in the Summa and that found in
Hooker's Laws.
THE KNOWLEDGE OF PARTICULAR ETHICAL PRINCIPLES
Hooker and St. Thomas disagree about the way in which particular
ethical principles are known to be true. St. Thomas regards these
principles as analytically true, true in virtue of the meanings of the
terms. Hooker regards them as self-evident to the rational man. An
example may help to elucidate this difference. Up until the end of the
nineteenth century, many mathematicians held that men merely intuitively apprehended the truth of the proposition "In a plane a
straight line is the shortest distance between two points." More recently, mathematicians have argued that this same proposition is
evident not because men intuitively apprehend its truth, but because it is analytically true. It is true in virtue of the meanings of
the terms. When we understand the meaning of "straight line" and
"the shortest distance between two points," we can see the truth
of the proposition because the predicate is part of the definition of
"straight line." Thus both schools of thought agree that the proposition is obviously true, but they give different accounts of what it
means to be true. In exactly the same way, Hooker and St. Thomas
give different accounts of the manner in which ethical principles are
said to be known. However, since this interpretation of St. Thomas's
position is not the standard interpretation, we must argue for it.
In Medieval Philosophy, the phrase which denotes "analytically
known" is per se nota. For example, William of Ockham explains:
"A proposition per se nota is one which is evidently known from a
knowledge of its terms."9
This definition is of a proposition per se nota in the proper sense
of that phrase. Ockham does allow for an improper sense of per se
nota which means only "self-evident" in the weaker sense as explained above. However, the improper sense of per se nota need not
concern us because it is clear that, in the relevant sections of the
Summa, St. Thomas restates Ockham's definition of per se nota in
its proper sense.
9 Í Sententiarum (Lyon 1491), prologium, q. I 1 E: Propositio per se nota est illa
quae scitur evidenter ex quacumque notitia terminorum ipsius.
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A proposition is per se nota whose predicate belongs to the intelligible
meaning of its subject.10
St. Thomas adds that there are some propositions which are per se
nota in their natures, but which may not be known in this way to
all. For example: "Man is a rational animal" is analytically true
because "man" means "rational animal." However, someone who
does not know the meaning of "man" might yet know that this
proposition is true; but he would have to know this fact in some
other way, perhaps by induction. Thus St. Thomas is affirming that,
among per se nota propositions, some are self-evident to all; others
can be known to be analytically true only to wise men after careful
examination.
St. Thomas believes without question that there are many ethical
principles which are analytically known or per se nota. In the same
article of the Summa, he enunciates the principle: "Good is to be
done and evil to be avoided." From the context, it is clear that this
principle is to be taken as per se nota in its proper sense and thus is
analytically true. If one knows what "good" means, then one knows
that good is to be done. If one knows what "evil" means, then one
can from that fact alone know that evil is to be avoided. Furthermore,
St. Thomas does not think that only very general moral principles
are per se nota; some particular principles are also per se nota. He
not only says, "The first general precepts of the law of nature are
analytically known to one in possession of natural reason,"11 but he
also says that such precepts are contained in the Decalogue. In the
Ten Commandments are contained moral principles analytically selfevident to all. The Decalogue also implicitly contains other precepts
which are known to be analytically true only to those who have the
requisite knowledge of the meanings of the terms. There are
. . . those [precepts] which are primary and general which . . . are inscribed in natural reason as analytically known, such as^that one should
do evil to no one, and others such; and those which are found, on careful
examination on the part of wise men, to be in accord with reason.12
10 S.T. I II, 94 2 in corpore, p. 78: . . . propositio dicitur per se nota cujus
praedicatum est de ratione subjecti.
11 S.T. I II 100 4 ad 1, Vol. 29, p. 70: Sicut enim prima praecepta communia
legis naturae sunt per se nota habenti rationem naturalem.
12 S.T. I II 100 3 in corpore, Vol. 29, p. 64: . . . ilia scilicet quae sunt prima et
communia, quorum non oportet aliam editionem esse nisi quod sunt scripta in
ratione naturali quasi per se nota, sicut quod nulli debet homo malefacere, et alia
hujusmodi; et iterum ilia quae per diligentem inquisitionem sapientum inveniuntur rationi convenire. . . .
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Of course the Decalogue also contains precepts which are per se nota
only to the man in whom God has infused faith. The prohibitions
against blasphemy and against images are of this last type. How
ever, the fact still remains that for St. Thomas all Ten Command
ments are analytically self-evident either to natural reason or to rea
13
son infused by faith.
Having established that some precepts of the Moral Law are selfevident because they are analytically true and that some of these
analytically self-evident precepts are contained in the Decalogue, we
are now in a position to examine a text which has given St.
Thomas's translators a great deal of difficulty:
All moral precepts must, of necessity, belong to the law of nature, though
not all in the same way. There are some which immediately and of them
selves the natural reason of every man judges to be done or not to be done,
such as "Honor thy father and thy mother," and, "Thou shalt not kill,"
"Thou shalt not steal." These belong to the law of nature absolutely.
Others there are which are judged by the wise to be done in the light of
more careful consideration. These, indeed, belong to the law of nature, but
as necessitating instruction on the part of ordinary people by the
wise... . 1 4
Translators of this passage have had a great deal of difficulty in ren
dering the per se (of itself) found at the beginning of the second
sentence. They have tended to translate it in such a way that the
sentence gives the impression that the sample commands are just selfevident and not analytically self-evident.15
13 S.T. III100 3 in corpore.
14 S.T. I II 100 1 in corpore, Vol. 29, p. $8ί: . . . omnia praecepta moralia pertineant ad legem naturae, sed diversimode. Quaedam enim sunt quae statim per
se ratio naturalis cujuslibet hominis dijudicat esse facienda vel non facienda;
sicut, "Honora patrem tuum et matrem tuum," et, "Non occides," "Non furtum
fades." Et hujusmodi sunt absolute de lege naturae. Quaedam vero sunt quae
subtilori consideratione rationis a sapientibus judicantur esse observanda. Et ista
sic sunt de lege naturae, ut tarnen indigeant disciplina, qua minores a sapientioribus instruantur.. .
15 Cf. A. Pegis, Basic Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas (Random House, 1945),
Vol. II, p. 828: "For there are certain things which the natural reason of every
man, of its own accord, and at once, judges to be done or not to be done." St.
Thomas Aquinas: Summa Theologica (Blackfriars, 1969), Vol. 29, trans. D.
Bourke and A. Littledale, p. 59fr "There are some which the natural reason of
every man judges straightway to be done or not to be done." The Pocket Aquinas,
ed. V. J. Bourke, Washington Square Press, i960, p. 20of: "For, there are some
things that the natural reason of every man judges immediately and essentially as
things to be done or not to be done. . ." The linguistic evidence is certainly in
favor of coupling the per se with the quae and not with the ratio naturalis as
these translators have done. This evidence further strengthens the interpretation
given above.
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But it is clear from the other passages which have been cited
that in this passage the commands cannot be merely self-evident,
but are analytically self-evident. St. Thomas seems to be saying that
the commands of the Decalogue are self-evident in virtue of the
meanings of the terms, and not just that everyone recognizes their
truth. If one knows the meaning of "father," he knows that a father
is to be honored; if he knows the meaning of "steal," he knows that
one ought not to steal; and if he knows what "murder" means, he
knows that one ought not to murder. In St. Thomas's strict use of
"deduction," these principles are not deductively arrived at, because
no premises are employed. However, in the looser twentieth century
usage, his is a deductive ethics. As a caution, it is important to point
out that for St. Thomas moral philosophy is not purely deductive
even in the contemporary sense of that term. Many contingent facts
must be taken into account in deciding what to do in particular
circumstances. The contingent facts of the situation are always important in applying general rules. Sometimes even exceptions to
these rules must be countenanced.16 But the conclusion remains that
the general precepts of the natural law are analytically self-evident.
In the passages cited above, St. Thomas employs "the natural law"
in the sense of "moral law." We must now ask: What is the relationship between these analytically self-evident precepts of the Moral
täw to the Law of Nature, understood as what beings naturally
do? Another way to put this question is to ask: Why should one take
a statement which is per se nota as imposing a moral requirement
upon men? St. Thomas's answer links the discussion of the analytically true precepts to his earlier discussion of the Law of Nature.
Therefore, since human conduct is said to be directed toward reason, which
is the proper principle of human action, that conduct is said to be good
which is congruent with reason, and whatever is in discord with reason
is called evil.17
One ought to take analytically true principles as morally binding,
not only because they are true, but also because action in accord
with reason is a natural tendency of man, and hence is good. Thus
the two parts of St. Thomas's discussion, the "good" as "end" and
"natural tendency," and the self-evident moral principles, are
brought into close harmony.
16 S.T. III 94 4 in corpore.
Tj S.T. I II 100 1 in corpore: Cum autem humani mores dicantur in ordine ad
rationem, quae est proprium principium humanorum actuum, illi mores dicuntur
boni qui rationi congruunt, mali autem qui a ratione discordant.
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HOOKER'S TREATMENT OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF
MORAL PRINCIPLES

If this interpretation of St. Thomas is correct, we can now see how
Hooker departs from him. Where St. Thomas thinks the simple precepts of the Moral Law to be analytically true, Hooker regards them
as merely evident to natural reason. In an important passage in the
Laws, Hooker mentions two ways to know the good:
And of discerning goodness there are but these two ways; the one, the
knowledge of the causes whereby it is made such; the other, the observation of those signs and tokens, which being annexed always unto goodness,
argue that where they are found, there also goodness is, although we
know not the cause by force whereof it is there.18
He goes on to observe that "the former of these is the most sure and
infallible way, but so hard that all shun it."
It is difficult, if not impossible, to know what Hooker means by
"the knowledge of the causes whereby it is made such." He might
mean that it is hard to discover the reasons why something ought to
be taken as good; or he might mean that it is difficult to discover the
good which is proper to a being by studying the causes why something is the kind of thing that it is, i.e. by discovering why it has
a particular nature. The first interpretation fits the natural sense of the
passage, but the second interpretation is congruent with what he
has already said when he defines the good of a being as the perfection or completion of its nature. In any event, it is unnecessary for
us to reach a conclusion concerning Hooker's meaning, since he
proceeds to follow the second way.
Into the causes of goodness we will not make any curious or deep inquiry;
to touch them now and then it shall be sufficient, when they are so near at
hand that easily they may be conceived without any far-removed discourse.
The premise which Hooker adopts as the basis for following the
second way is that there is an invariable connection between signs
of goodness and goodness itself. From this premise one can argue
that "where they are found, there also is goodness." Since Hooker
does not attempt to give an account of this invariable relationship,
it is safest to assume that he takes this relationship as a given and
not to attempt to speculate upon Hooker's reasons for believing that
there is one. It is sufficient for us to observe that Hooker believes
18 Laws, 18, p. 226.
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that there is an invariable connection between the signs and tokens
of goodness and goodness itself and to proceed on that basis.
"The most certain token of evident goodness is, if the general
persuasion of all men do so account it."19 For a general agreement of
mankind nothing more is needed than the intuitive self-evidence
of propositions under consideration. Additional passages support this
interpretation.
The main principles of Reason are in themselves apparent. For to make
nothing evident of itself unto man's understanding were to take away all
possibility of knowing any thing. And herein that of Theophrastus is
true, "They that seek a reason of all things do utterly overthrow Reason."
In every kind of knowledge some such grounds there are, as that being
proposed the mind doth presently embrace them as free from all possibility of error, clear and manifest without proof. In which kind axioms or principles more general are such as this, "that the greater good is
to be chosen before the less."20
Hooker claims the same intuitive self-evidence for the precepts of
the Decalogue and the Golden Rule.
Axioms . . . so manifest that they need no further proof, are such as
these, "God to be worshipped;" "parents to be honoured;" "others to be
used by us as we ourselves would be by them." Such things, as soon as
they are alleged, all men acknowledge to be good; they require no proof
or further discourse to be assured of their goodness.21
One might speculate as to the reasons why Hooker departs in this
most significant way from St. Thomas. A likely explanation is that
he mistook the meaning of per se nota where it appears in the
Summa. Since per se nota literally means "known through itself,"
it would be quite easy to take it as meaning only "self-evident" and
not as "analytically true." We have already shown that such a reading of St. Thomas is incorrect. We shall now point out the farreaching consequences of such an emendation.
If the precepts of the Moral Law are merely self-evident, then
knowledge of these precepts is reached independently of our knowledge of the natural. Thus, although "Act according to nature" is still
the primary moral rule, we need not know what our nature is in
order to know many of our duties. The autonomy of the precepts of
the Moral Law has a second consequence. In order to connect the
intuitively apprehended precepts of that law with natural tendencies,
19 Ibid., p. 226.
20 Ibid., p. 228.
21 Ibid., p. 229.
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Hooker does something very different from what St. Thomas does.
Where St. Thomas aifirms that because men have a natural tendency
to be rational, to act according to reason is a good, Hooker makes
a different point. He asserts that because men naturally judge certain
actions to be good, this fact in itself reveals that they are acting
according to nature. In putting his argument, Hooker falls back
upon the Aristotelean dictum that "For of things necessarily and
naturally done there is no more aifirmed but this, They keep either
always or for the most part one tenure/ " 22 From this he argues that
. . . although we know not the cause, yet thus much we know; that some
necessary cause there is, whensoever the judgments of all men generally or
for the most part run one and the same way, especially in matters of
natural discourse.23
Thus Hooker has changed the relationship between the self-evident
Moral Law and the Law of Nature. For example, although he agrees
with St. Thomas that because men have a natural tendency toward
self-preservation, they apprehend life as a good, Hooker can also say
that because men universally apprehend life as a good, this apprehension itself indicates that the preservation of life is a law of their
nature. This change of view is of the greatest significance. It lays the
groundwork for the position taken by Joseph Butler a century and
a half later. Since the precepts of the Moral Law are known independently of the Law of Nature, in Butler's view the Law of Nature
is to be followed only if it is in conformity with the Moral Law.
However, before we examine the views of Joseph Butler, we shall
further document the departure from Thomist principles in the
writings of Henry More.
MORE'S TREATMENT OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
ETHICS AND THE LAW OF NATURE
In his Enchiridion Ethicum, Henry More departs significantly from
St. Thomas and Hooker concerning the relationship between the
Moral Law and the Law of Nature. Where for St. Thomas as well as
for Hooker the primary ethical precept is "Act in conformity with
nature," More regards actions in conformity with nature as only a
means to the good life. He does not regard the perfection of a nature
as its highest good, but only as an instrument by which that good
can be attained. Hence the human good is not characterized by ref22 Ibid., p. 227.
23 Ibid.
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erence to human nature. It is autonomously characterized as happiness or pleasure.
In what has just been said, we have carefully avoided saying that
More defines "good" as "happiness." In fact, he gives no formal
definition of "good." He approaches his subject in another way, with
the question "What is the highest good?" and not "What do we
mean by good?"
Early in the Enchiridion he implicitly identifies happiness or
pleasure as the greatest good by remarking that "Ethicks are divided
into two parts, The Knowledge of Happiness, and the Acquisition of
it."2é He made the identification more explicit by arguing that all
people desire "to live therein, or at least not without it/' From this
he argues only that men "highly value" pleasure and not, as did St.
Thomas, that since the desire for pleasure is a natural tendency,
pleasure is a good.25 Thus, although More does not tell us whether
or not "greatest good" means simply "happiness," he makes it clear
that whatever the good, we seek it for the sake of pleasure.
More also believes that we can achieve happiness only when we
live according to nature. Quoting from Aristotle, he describes
pleasure as "A Restitution of every Creature from a state imperfect,
or preternatural, unto its own proper Nature."2* "And . . . that
Restitution unto such a State must be the most intrinsic and peculiar Pleasure."27
For More, then, one could not be happy unless one fulfilled his
nature. But in addition one could not be happy unless one were
virtuous. For virtue is connected to nature as nature is connected to
happiness.
Now a true Feeling and Possession of Virtue, is also the conversion or
bringing a man about, from what is contrary to his Nature, to that which is
conformable to it. . . . For (as the Emperor Marcus Aurelius observes) to
act according to Nature or according to Reason, is in a rational Creature the
same thing. Wherefore all pravity is repugnant to human Nature. But
. . . Virtue is natural to human nature.28
Hence, "this is plain, that such inward Working and Conformity to
Virtue's Law, is that which dominates true Happiness."2*
24 Enchiridion Ethicum, English Translation of 1690 (Facsimile Text Society,
1930), p. 3·
25 Ibid., pp. 4&5·
26 Ibid., p. 5.
27 Ibid., p. 6.
28 Ibid., p. 5f.
29 Ibid., p. 7.
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With More we are in a different world from that of St. Thomas or
of Hooker. By means of the virtuous life, we conform to nature;
and by conformity with nature, we achieve our highest happiness or
greatest good. Where St. Thomas and Hooker affirm that "what is
natural to man is virtuous," More only affirms that "virtue is natural
to man." Both St. Thomas and More agree that "happiness is a good
because all men desire it"; but they treat this proposition in different ways. St. Thomas argues that happiness is a good because the
pursuit of it is natural to man. More argues that happiness is a good
because man's constant pursuit of it shows that men highly value it.
As a result the Law of Nature is not that by which the Moral Law is
to be specified. Conformity to the Law of Nature now merely serves
the requirements of the Moral Law. Thus the relationship between
the two has been radically altered.
HENRY MORE'S TREATMENT OF SELF-EVIDENT
MORAL PRECEPTS
Henry More follows Hooker in treating the precepts of the Moral
Law as intuitively self-evident and not as analytically true. Hç
echoes Hooker in quoting from Aristotle that "some things are intelligible tho men know not the reason why." He then goes on to
draw forth a stock of . . . Principles, as being immediately and irresistibly true, need no proof; such, I mean, as all Moral Reason may in a sort
have reference unto; even as all Mathematical Demonstrations are found in
some first undeniable Axioms.30
Of these undeniable axioms, he further says:
These and such like Sayings may justly be called Moral Axioms or
Noemas: for they are so clear and evident of themselves, that, if men consider impartially, they need no manner of Deduction or Argument, but are
agreed to as soon as heard. And thus we are prepared, as with so many
Touchstones, to let the inquisitive know what Right Reason is. For in
short, it is that which by certain and necessary Consequences, is at
length resolved into some intellectual Principle which is immediately
true?1
Lest it be thought that "the certain and necessary Consequence" is
analytic necessity, it is sufficient to examine a few of the Axioms
and Noemas proposed by More. Although "What is good is to be
chosen; what is evil to be avoided," could be taken as analytic, he
also cites others which are clearly not analytic. "Among the several
30 Ibid., p. 20.
31 Ibid., p. 27.
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kinds or degrees of sensible Beings which are in the world, some are
better and more excellent than others." "In things of which we
have no experience, we must believe those who profess themselves
to have experience"; and "return good for good, and not evil for
good."32 Thus it is even clearer than it was in Hooker's case that for
More, "self-evident" means merely "intuitively apprehended."
THE COMPLETION OF THE REVOLUTION IN JOSEPH BUTLER
We have come a long way from St. Thomas. Ethical principles are
intuitively apprehended; and the Law of Nature serves the good and
is not that by which we define the Moral Law. No clearer statement
of these views is found anywhere than in the writings of Joseph
Butler. He explicitly says that the Moral Law is intuitively apprehended.
That which renders beings capable of moral government, is their having
a moral nature, and moral faculties of perception and of action. . . . That
we have this moral approving and disapproving faculty, is certain from
our experiencing it in ourselves, and recognizing it in each other.33
This moral faculty he sometimes called "conscience," and he emphatically states that the approbation of conscience is the only source
of obligation.
But allowing that mankind hath the rule of right within himself, yet it
may be asked, "What obligations are we under to attend to and follow
it?" . . . That your conscience approves of and attests to such a course of
action, is itself alone an obligation.34
One ought to stress the importance of this last passage for an
understanding of Butler's moral theory. If the special moral faculty
alone attests to the presence of an obligation, then a natural description of an action will not establish its moral worth. Something
else will be needed, the attestation of conscience. Hence Butler can
not agree with St. Thomas that if one knows what murder is, he
knows that murder is wrong, or that if we know what a father is,
then we know analytically that we ought to honor our parents.
"That your conscience approves and attests to such a course of action
is itself alone an obligation."
Butler's Intuitivism has further implications for the relationship
between the Moral Law and the Law of Nature. Instead of the Law of
32 Ibid., pp. 22-25.

33 "Dissertation II: Of the Nature of Virtue," The Analogy of Religion, etc.,
George Bell & Sons, 1898, p. 334Í.
34 "Sermon III," Ibid., pp. 4iof.
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Nature defining the good, and thus it ought to be followed, Butler
can only argue that the Law of Nature ought to be followed when it
is in agreement with the Moral Law. After noting that "Reasonable
self-love and conscience are the chief or superior principles in the
nature of man," he concludes that self-interest can be followed because "Conscience and self-love . . . always lead in the same way.
Duty and interest are perfectly coincident.. ,"35
Whether or not Butler was correct in his assertion that duty and
interest are thus practically identical, it is nonetheless true that he
has completely reversed the relationship between the Moral Law and
the Law of Nature as it appeared in Hooker and St. Thomas. As far
as our knowledge of it is concerned, the Moral Law is now fully independent of the natural order of things. The epistemological independence of the Moral Law had far reaching consequences, not
only for Butler's moral theology, but also for his natural theology.
For he was now in a position to lay the groundwork for a form of
the Teleological Argument which has had a venerable history. One
form of the Teleological Argument is found in St. Thomas's Fifth
Way. We note that in human affairs adaptation of means to ends is
always the result of intelligent behavior. We also observe the
adaptation of means to ends in the natural world. It is then argued
that by analogy we must conclude that there must be an intelligent
designer for the natural world.36
It is important to observe that in this form of the argument any
adaptation of means to ends in the natural world will do. The purpose of the argument is limited, to demonstrate only that the
world has an intelligent designer and not necessarily that the designer has a benevolent purpose.
However, the Teleological Argument can be put in another form.
In this form a particular type of order is appealed to, what Harold
Höffding called the propensity of the natural world for the preservation of human values. Such an argument was put by F. R. Tennant
when he argued that nature is productive and protective of the
moral life.37
It is not our purpose to discuss the merits of this form of the
argument. It is rather to note that Butler suggests the possibility of
such an argument.
Indeed the natural and moral constitution and government of the world
are so connected, as to make up together but one scheme; and it is highly
35 "Sermon III," Ibid., p. 414.
36 S.T. I II 2 3 in corpore.
37 Philosophical Theology, Vol. II (Cambridge University Press, 1930), Chapter 4.
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probable that the first is formed and carried on merely in subserviency to
the latter, as the vegetable world is for the animal, and organized bodies
for minds.38
Thus while St. Thomas argues that self-preservation is a good because men tend to preserve their own lives, those who followed
Butler's suggestion can argue that the instinct for self-preservation is
a good because it tends to keep men alive. Life itself is a good because it is a necessary condition for the moral life. Nowhere is the
difference between St. Thomas and Joseph Butler more forcefully
shown. For the second form of the Teleological Argument can only
be formulated when our knowledge of the Moral Law is independent
of the Natural Law. Then one can ask the question: "Does the Law
of Nature make possible the moral life?" If, however, the primary
ethical precept is: Act in conformity with nature, then the question
"Is nature productive of moral values?" cannot arise. For when the
Moral Law is specified by the Law of Nature, it makes no sense to
ask: "Does the Law of Nature support the Moral Law?" It is the
Moral Law.
CONCLUSION
In the course of this paper we have commented upon a revolution in
English moral theory. The decisive step was taken when Hooker
asserted that moral precepts were merely intuitively self-evident and
not analytically true. Once this modification was made, the essential
element in Butler's view was adopted. Having made this logical
point, one ought to attempt some assessment of the fundamental issues involved. There is a whole nest of difficulties here and in a
short paper one can only give a sketch of a possible resolution.
Certainly the central issue is whether moral precepts are analytically true or merely evident. Does a knowledge of what murder is
entail that murder is wrong? One of the reasons why Intuitivists
have adopted their view is because they could not see this analytical
link. Any empirical description of an act seemed not to entail the
additional statement that murder is wrong. In his book Moral Notions, Julius Kovesi discusses this controversy at length.39 His conclusion is that if the description of an act comprises only its material components, then the Intuitivist is correct and there is no entailment. By material components of an act, e.g. murder, is meant the
administration of poison, or the plunging of a knife into the
heart, or the placing of a pillow over the face. From such descrip38 "Analogy of Religion," Ibid., p. 179.
39 (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967) passim but espec. Chap. 1.
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tions it does not follow that these acts are wrong. It is one of the
strengths of the Intuitivist's position to have noticed this lack of
entailment. But where the Intuitivists went wrong is in assuming
that there is some extra non-empirical quality which acts have, i.e.
goodness, or requiredness, or the like. The difficulty is that we seem
not to be able to pick out such a quality. Professor Kovesi suggests
that it is not the material components of an act which are significant for ethics, but its formal elements. The point or purpose of
an action is what is relevant for its moral assessment and not its material components. That St. Thomas intended to include the formal
elements of an action in his description of the act is clear from his
discussion of lying.40 According to St. Thomas, it is not the material elements, speaking a falsehood, but the intention to deceive,
which constitutes lying. If the formal elements of an act are the relevant ones for moral consideration, then it may be analytically true
that murder is wrong. If murder is characterized as the intentional
killing of a human being for personal or private gain, then murder
may always be wrong. If Mr. Kovesi is correct, St. Thomas is more
nearly on the right track than is Hooker or Butler.
Although St. Thomas is correct in the notion that there is a fundamental connection between "good" and "end," it does not follow
that because we naturally tend to do certain things, the objects
of these natural tendencies are always good. From what has just been
said, we can only conclude that ends are relevant to moral evaluation, and not that any natural end is a good. In this connection, we
are not making the point that, since everything which happens is
natural, it is impossible to divide natural tendencies into some more
and some less natural. Nor are we making Butler's point that if a
differentiation is attempted by noting that some desires are stronger
than others, the relative strength of the impulses is not decisive for
moral evaluation.41 Nor are we making the point that it is difficult
to decide what the natural end of an act is. Is the end of sex the
precreation of children or is it merely the happiness of the partners?
We are only making the point that although men have a strong
natural desire to have a large family, it does not follow that the object of this desire is always a good. Thus if we are to criticize
St. Thomas, it is for too readily assuming that the end of a natural
tendency is always a good, instead of just maintaining that the end
or point of an action is a highly relevant feature of the action when
we evaluate its moral worth.
40 S.T. IIII100.
41 Ibid., Sermon III, p. 414.

